Zoning -- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.: An Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning? by Chester, Edwin P.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 55 | Number 3 Article 15
3-1-1977
Zoning -- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.: An Implicit
Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning?
Edwin P. Chester
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edwin P. Chester, Zoning -- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.: An Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary
Zoning?, 55 N.C. L. Rev. 733 (1977).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol55/iss3/15
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The IRS would clearly be justified under this judicially developed
principle of section 170 in disallowing deductions by the Revenue
Ruling 76-442 organization's clients for their donations to the extent
the value of the donations equals the cost of comparable tax planning
services. This action would substantially exorcise those dimensions of
commercialism and private benefit to which the IRS objected. Such
an approach would have been preferable to denying 501(c)(3) status
altogether, for the prior decisions and policy of section 501 would
support a finding by a federal court that the organization qualifies for
the exemption. Section 501 as manipulated in Revenue Ruling 76-
442 is simply too blunt an instrument for use in deterring individual
taxpayers from utilizing the charitable exemption as a subterfuge by
which otherwise nondeductible personal legal expenses are trans-
formed into charitable gifts. Section 170 could accomplish this result
more directly and with more finesse. Such an alternative approach
would permit the organization to continue to pursue its purpose of en-
couraging gifts to charity without imposing a tax burden of atonement
on the organization itself for the possible sins of its clients.
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Zoning-Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.: An Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning?
In recent years there has been considerable uncertainty in the
federal courts about the precise nature of the equal protection standards
applicable to cases of allegedly exclusionary zoning.' Lower federal
1. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 799-800 (1969). Compare Comment, Challenging Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 10 RxCH. L REv. 646, 686 (1976) (courts will apply rational basis
test, so challenge will usually fail) and Comment, Does a Zoning Ordinance with Ra-
cially Discriminatory Effects Violate the Constitution? Metropolitan Housing Develop-
nent Corporation v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 141, 157 (1976)
("steadily expanding limits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
have now infringed on the formerly solid police powers of local governments to
determine land use") with Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent
Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 157 (1975) (ordinance
that perpetuates residential segregation likely to fall, as federal court will apply strict
scrutiny test).
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courts have upheld the claims of low and moderate income plaintiffs
seeking adequately priced housing in the suburbs where the activities
of the municipality were overtly discriminatory, - but courts have found
it more difficult to deal with cases in which discrimination is more
subtle but equally effective.3 While generally disfavoring the claims
of low income plaintiffs, 4 the United States Supreme Court had, until
recently, avoided deciding exclusionary zoning cases on equal protec-
tion grounds. The recent case of Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.5 is the first instance in which
the Supreme Court has directly met the substantive equal protection
issue, and its decision implies that plaintiffs will have to carry a heavy
burden to be successful in the federal courts.
Arlington Heights, a suburb about twenty-five miles northwest of
Chicago, consists primarily of single family homes that accommodated
a population that was 99.6% white in 1970.0 In 1970, the Clerics of
St. Viator (a religious order) decided to develop fifteen acres located
within Arlington Heights for low and moderate income housing. The
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a nonprofit
housing developer that had constructed similar projects in nearby
suburbs, was given a ninety-nine year lease on the property with an
option to purchase contingent upon obtaining federal financing and the
2. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (within two months of HUD approval of a housing
project, all-white area incorporated itself and zoned out low and moderate income
housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970) (city rezoned plaintiff's land for park, declared
building moratorium, and mayor refused to sign form that would allow plaintiff's project
to tie onto city sewer system); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970) (city's refusal to rezone plaintiff's property contrary to recommendation of city
planning director).
3. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). This case was perhaps the first in which a
court of appeals found no discriminatory intent on the part of defendants, and yet found
for plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 18 to 25 inlra. See also Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which non-resident low and
moderate income blacks challenged the zoning ordinance of a municipality as unconstitu-
tional because it reserved only two percent of the land for non-single-family residential
use. The Court held for defendants on procedural grounds, but Justice Brennan,
dissenting, wrote that "the opinion . . . can be explained only by an indefensible
hostility to the claim on the merits." Id. at 520. See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971) (upholding state constitutional amendment that would require that residents
of a municipality approve by referendum the location, construction or purchase of low
income housing in their jurisdiction).
5. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
6. Id. at 558.
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town's approval of a zoning change.7 The MHDC contracted with
an architect to draw up plans for the proposed development. The final
plans provided for 190 units of two-story townhouses, over half of
which were to be particularly suited to elderly residents, and also pro-
vided that sixty percent of the land would be devoted to green space.
8
MHDC applied to the Village of Arlington Heights for a zoning
change, but this request was denied.9 The fifteen acre parcel had been
zoned R-3 (for single family dwellings), and would have to be rezoned
to R-5 (for multi-family dwellings) in order for the townhouses to be
built.' 0 The town's zoning plan called for an R-5 zone to be designated
only as a buffer between single family homes and such incompatible
uses as manufacturing or commercial areas. The parcel under consid-
eration faced single family dwellings on two sides and the open areas
of the church land on the other two sides. The Village Plan Commis-
sion turned down the request to rezone after a series of public meet-
ings" and despite MHDC's revision of the project design to meet the
village's technical objections. 12
The plaintiffs, MHDC and individuals representing those moder-
ate income minority members who worked or desired to work and live
in Arlington Heights but could not find decent and reasonably priced
7. Id. at 559. Initially MHDC intended to use the federally subsidized § 236
program but that program was halted in 1973 and MHDC had since indicated its
willingness to participate in the federally subsidized § 8 housing program of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. V 1975), as
amended by Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068.
Id. at 558 n.2.
8. 97 S. Ct. at 559; Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1975); Brief for Respondents at 7, Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
9. 97 S. Ct. at 559-60. Two members of the Arlington Heights Planning Board
who dissented from the decision to deny the rezoning noted that there was no separate
classification for townhouses in the Arlington Heights zoning plan and that R-5 was
applied only because it was as close an approximation as was available. They further
noted that professional planners tend to treat townhouses as more akin to R-3 than R-5.
Comment, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J., supra note 1, at 142 n.7.
10. 97 S. Ct. at 558-59.
11. Id. at 559. Plaintiff MHDC attempted to impress upon the Court the
explicitly racial nature of the community response to the project that was evidenced at
three public meetings, in the local press, and in letters sent to town officials. Brief for
Respondent at 16-19. The Court, however, preferred to emphasize the positive concerns
voiced by the town officials in reaching the decision. 97 S. Ct. at 559-60.
12. Following the zoning change request investigations were undertaken and re-
ports issued by the local fire chief, building commissioner, director of public works and
acting director of engineering. Only one problem was mentioned, that of surface water
runoff, and the plans were changed to ameliorate that impact. Plaintiffs' Complaint at
13, Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Ill. 1974); see 97 S. Ct. at 559.
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housing,'" filed suit in the federal district court alleging that the
village's refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation, 14 denied plaintiff
developer's right to use its property in a reasonable fashion under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, 15 and denied
individual plaintiffs' rights under the fourteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C.
sections 1981, 1982 and 1983, and the Fair Housing Act.16 The dis-
trict court found that the village's motivation in denying the rezoning
was based on its concern for property values and the integrity of its
zoning plan, and that there was no act of invidious discrimination that
would require the showing of a compelling state interest. 17
On appeal' 8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked closely
at the evidence to determine if the Village had applied its zoning laws
with particular strictness in this case. It could not find clearly errone-
ous the trial court's determination that the village's purpose in denying
the rezoning application was a legitimate concern with the integrity of
the zoning plan.'" The court recognized that the town's failure to
rezone had a disproportionate effect on Blacks in the Chicago area, but
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in James v. Valtierra,20
13. The Court ruling devotes substantial space to the matter of plaintiffs' standing.
97 S. Ct. at 561-63. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Court had denied
similar claims by nonresident plaintiffs seeking low income housing in the suburbs,
organizations that owned land in the defendant community, and builders' organizations
whose members had been economically injured. Denying standing to all plaintiffs, the
Court indicated that only those who were prepared and able to build a home or who
would be eligible to inhabit a particular project currently precluded and had been denied
the right either by the local ordinance or its enforcement would have standing to use the
courts. Id. at 516. Under Warth, MHDC could challenge an ordinance or its
enforcement on due process grounds as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable under
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), but it could not assert the rights of
others with respect to an equal protection challenge. Plaintiff Ramson was empowered to
assert the equal protection claim because he would qualify for and would like to reside in
MHDC's project if it were built, and then if MHDC's claims were successful the court
could have a practical way of granting relief to him. See 97 S. Ct. at 563.
14. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 15, 21.
15. Id. at 22.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
17. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp.
208, 211 (N.D. II. 1974).
18. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975).
19. That evidence showed that the town had rezoned land from R-3 to R-5 60
times. In about two-thirds of the cases the action had complied with the zoning plan. Of
the 15 stated failures, only four were clear violations, and in a number of cases where the
rezoning was denied the town was applying its buffer zone policy. Id. at 412.
S20. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In James, the Court upheld a provision of the California
Constitution requiring that state-developed housing for low income persons be approved
only after approval by community referendum.
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the Seventh Circuit could not infer racial discrimination from dispropor-
tionate impact alone.
The court did not stop its inquiry at this point, but went on to
assess the town's decision in light of its historical context and ultimate
effect. 21 It noted that the Chicago metropolitan area had a long history
of segregated housing patterns. Although it did not suggest that Arling-
ton Heights was responsible for these segregated patterns,22 the court
did find that Arlington Heights had exploited those extensive patterns
of segregation by failing to integrate its community23 and was in this
case again attempting to avoid its responsibility by rejecting "the only
present hope of. . .making even a small contribution toward eliminat-
ing the pervasive problem of segregated housing. '24  Unable to find
a compelling state interest that would justify the rezoning denial, the
court implied that Arlington Heights had a duty to alleviate the problem
of segregated housing.25
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 but before the case
was argued, the Court decided Washington v. Davis,2' a case involving
employment discrimination.28 In Washington the Court cited several
cases, among them the Seventh Circuit's Arlington Heights decision, as
incorrect applications of equal protection law.29 Writing for the
21. 517 F.2d at 413-14.
22. While not directly responsible for the areawide pattern, the court noted that
plaintiffs' demographic expert had testified that Arlington Heights was the most segregat-
ed community in the Chicago metropolitan area among municipalities of greater than
50,000 residents. Id. at 414 n.1.
23. The court's exploitation charge was based on a Seventh Circuit case in which a
builder was held liable for charging inflated prices for housing in black neighborhoods as
compared with similar housing it had constructed in white neighborhoods. Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
24. 517 F.2d at 415. Although the court did not cite any cases, there is precedent
in state courts for requiring that a town take into account the regional housing situation
in enacting and enforcing its zoning plans. See cases cited notes 88-91 infra. But see
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
25. 517 F.2d at 414. Whether the court would require that the town take
affirmative steps to alleviate the problem or that it merely refrain from frustrating any
attempted solution is not clear, but the latter possibility seems more probable. For a
discussion of the merits of the remedy that would require affirmative action, see note 88
infra.
26. 423 U.S. 1030 (1975).
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. The case involved unsuccessful black applicants for police training in Washing-
ton, D.C., who were challenging the use of a written examination testing verbal skills as
a criterion for selection of candidates. The Court denied their claim that the test was a
denial of equal protection because it excluded a higher proportion of blacks than whites.
Id.
29. Id. at 244 n.12. Other cases cited, all of which dealt with housing and zoning
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majority Justice White said, "[w]e have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the govern-
ment to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of an-
other." 0  Disproportionate impact was held to be relevant to the in-
quiry, but not determinative.3'
While the Court could have simply remanded Arlington Heights32"
for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis,3 the Court chose
to use the case to elaborate on the Washington ruling. Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell held that proof of the racially discriminatory
intent or purpose that would be necessary to invoke the Court's strict
scrutiny test was to be determined by "a sensitive inquiry into such cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.""1  Dis-
proportionate impact might provide an important starting point, but
would not be determinative, absent a stark pattern of discrimination."
In the usual case alleging racial discrimination, at least three
factors might be considered: "a series of official actions taken for in-
vidious purposes";" "a specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision";3 7 and departures from normal substantive and
and had been finally decided, were Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971)
(public housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (zoning); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (urban renewal); Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afj'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (public
housing).
30. 426 U.S. at 242.
31. Id. at 242-43.
32. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
33. In his dissent, Justice White indicated that he would have preferred not to
decide the case at all, but would rather have followed the Court's usual practice and
remanded the case to the lower court for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis.
Id. at 567.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id. Here the Court used as an example Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), a case in which a state legislature changed the boundaries of a town from a
square to an irregular 28-sided figure, effectively eliminating 99% of the town's black
voters from the voting rolls.
36. 97 S. Ct. at 564, citing the following cases: Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964) (school desegregation); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (voting
rights case in which there had been a long history of racial discrimination and a series of
contemporary activities that left little doubt of discriminatory intent); and Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), ajj'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (voting
rights).
37. 97 S. Ct. at 564. Here the Court cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), a case in which the Court had held invalid a recently passed California state
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the state from interfering with
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procedural sequences .3  In extraordinary cases, the legislative or ad-
ministrative history of the particular actions or statutes may be consid-
ered. 9 Applying these criteria to the case before it, the Supreme
Court noted the district court's finding that racial discrimination had
not motivated defendant;41 that the circuit court had determined that
the zoning ordinance had not been applied more harshly in this case
than it had been in most similar instances and thus there was no series
of discriminatory official acts;4 and that there was no evidence of dis-
crimination in the legislative and administrative history.42 Having de-
cided the constitutional issue, the Court remanded the case to the cir-
cuit court to pass on plaintiffs' complaint under the Fair Housing Act.
43
private discrimination in the lease or sale of real property, and Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971), in which the court of appeals had granted plaintiffs an injunction against the
town when it was shown that the town had declared a moratorium on subdivision
construction and rezoned the land on which plaintiffs had planned to construct low and
moderate income housing immediately after the town had become aware that the project
was being planned.
38. 97 S. Ct. at 564 (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970), in which the defendant city refused to rezone a parcel of land for low income
housing against the advice of its planning directors, and without a valid reason).
39. Id. at 565. The Court is clearly not suggesting use of legal and administrative
history except in a very unusual case. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974), indicate that a high degree of
privilege is accorded to legislators and lawmakers.
40. 97 S. Ct. at 565.
41. See note 19 supra.
42. The Court emphasized that the Planning Commission and Village Board were
apparently concerned with the integrity of the town zoning ordinance. The Court
refused to speculate on reasons why the Village Planner was never asked his opinion on
the proposed project. 97 S. Ct. at 566 n.19.
43. Id. The district court did not consider the Fair Housing Act claim because no
section was specifically pleaded and the court did not think any section was specifically
applicable to the facts of the case. 373 F. Supp. at 209. Section 3601 of the Act states,
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). Whether the Fair
Housing Act will be useful in the present case is not clear from court decisions. The one
exclusionary zoning case decided on the basis of the Fair Housing Act, United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975), held that the effect of defendant's actions was racial discrimination and required
the defendants to demonstrate a compelling state interest. The denial of certiorari in
this case may have been an early signal from the Court that it would be willing to allow
the evidence of a racially discriminatory effect to affect the outcome of a civil rights case
based on a statutory claim, when it would not allow effect to play any significant role in
those cases based on constitutional claims. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), the Court recognized that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (equal
employment opportunity) a prima facie showing of a racially disproportionate impact
would trigger increased judicial scrutiny, but declined to extend that standard to a
constitutional claim. Id. at 246-48. The remand of the Arlington Heights case may
well indicate that the Court is suggesting that it is up to the Congress to prescribe or the
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The holdings in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights make
a finding of racial discrimination much less likely by prohibiting courts
from inferring intent from disproportionate impact except in the most
outrageous cases 4 and by requiring a specific showing of intent to dis-
criminate."0 This approach is arguably not suitable for most equal pro-
tection cases, and is particularly inappropriate in the field of zoning and
housing.
In restricting the inquiry to the intent or purpose rather than the
impact of an official action or statute, the Court has limited the lower
courts to two types of evidentiary sources, both of which contain funda-
mental weaknesses. A court may look to an official action or series
of actions that may have led up to the challenged zoning action, or a
court may scrutinize the words or writings of those responsible for the
official action or statute in order to determine whether racial factors
motivated their decision.
The actions of officials prior to the passage of the challenged stat-
ute or taking of the action cannot be expected to provide much assist-
ance in the determination of discriminatory purpose or intent. From
the cases cited by the Court in Arlington Heights,40 it is clear that an
application of the Court's level of scrutiny will curb only the most
blatant and obvious examples of discrimination.47 Few municipal or
state officials would be expected to exhibit their prejudices or those of
their constituency so flagrantly.
The second consideration suggested by the Court is words or writ-
ings of the officials responsible for the challenged action. To rely on
the words or writings of the officials responsible presents a number
of evidentiary problems in any equal protection case. First, the court
lower courts to apply similar standards for the adjudication of equal rights claims in
cases involving something less than overt discrimination. See Comment, Applying the
Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128
(1976). But see Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 896 (1975). See generally Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative Histoty and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); Note, Discrimination in Employment and in
Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82
HARv. L. REv. 834 (1969).
44. For examples of challenges likely to be sustained even under Arlington Heights,
see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and cases cited note 2 supra.
45. For a thorough discussion of motivation as evidence in constitutional cases, see
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 564; see notes 36 & 37 supra.
47. See, e.g., Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961), in
which a Park Board condemned plaintiffs' land within three months of plaintiffs'
receiving city approval to build a subdivision that would be integrated. See also Crow v.
Brown, 475 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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is likely to find a multiplicity of constitutional and unconstitutional pur-
poses not only within the deliberative body, but also within any of the
individual members of that body. To attempt to determine the part
that the discriminatory purpose played in the decision would be ex-
tremely difficult. 48  Second, even assuming that the motivation of the
officials could be determined by looking at their words and writings,
at least with regard to this part of the test, the same act once struck
down as discriminatory could possibly be repassed following the recita-
tion of more constitutionally permissible words or writings.4  Third,
the purpose or motive behind an official act or statute does not neces-
sarily control the actual impact or effect of the act-good intentions
might produce unconstitutional acts and unconstitutional motives might
produce constitutionally acceptable acts. 50 Finally, the Supreme Court
has recognized that an in-depth inquiry into purposes of legislation for
the purpose of validating its constitutionality would be an unnecessary
or unwise intrusion into a coordinate branch of government .5
In light of these evidentiary difficulties, it appears that any plain-
tiff will bear a very heavy burden of proof when he challenges an offi-
cial act as discriminating under the equal protection clause. The
nature of zoning law is such that the burden of proof may be insur-
mountable in the case of challenges to zoning decisions. First, the acts
of local officials have traditionally been accorded a presumption of
validity by the courts, so the burden is immediately placed on the chal-
lengers of a zoning ordinance to establish that the regulation is clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable.12  Second, while open to the challenge that
48. The Court would appear to be aware of the difficuly of attempting to divine the
true intent of the legislature. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
49. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). Under a combined actions-
words test, however, a court might well find discriminatory intent sufficient to strike
down the second act, although under a pure words-writings standard, plaintiffs would
have no argument.
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem . . . procedures or . . . mechanisms" that
inhibit racial integration and are not related to job performance); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) ("It is of no consolation to an individual
denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith.").
51. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control."); see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); 1
C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 5.18-.19 (1975); 1A id. § 7.18 (1974).
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they do not serve a permissible purpose, zoning regulations are to a
great extent insulated from this type of challenge. Protection of prop-
erty values has long been a constitutionally accepted objective of zon-
ing,a3 and the discrimination inherent in the ordinance is primarily eco-
nomic discrimination. 4 The direct effect of that economic discrimina-
tion, however, is racial discrimination, because the poor include a dis-
proportionate number of minority individuals." Because local officials
have a judicially acceptable rationale for zoning out the poor,", and are
accorded a presumption of validity in their acts, proof of a racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose sufficient to require the strict scrutiny of
the Court will be inordinately difficult to obtain.
In many ways Arlington Heights represents the Court's reaffirma-
tion of some of its long-standing principles. First, the Court has a long
history of avoiding the issues involved in land use legislation. 7 After
53. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING
LAW §§ 5.04, 15.01 (1974). Mr. Williams, who spent ten years reading over 10,000
cases involving zoning and land use, id. at vii, suggests that in practice, the real motive
could be stated in terms of "ensuring an increase" in property values, and that the result
of a court's analysis of zoning issues in terms of the protection of property values
rationale is normally, though not overtly, an anti-social one, typically involving racial or
economic discrimination. Id. § 15.04.
54. Protection of property values is achieved not only by preventing incompatible
or unsightly uses near residential areas, but also by zoning out uses that would allow
high-density developments and mobile homes-uses that are thought to put a strain on
the local tax base and increase property tax rates. See L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB,
ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS 3-4 (1972). There is substantial evidence, however, that
apartments and high density uses, even with regard to school costs, more than pay their
way. See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATIONS
AND HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK]. In the case of
MHDC there was also substantial evidence that the project would more than pay its way.
Brief for Respondents at 9, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
The discrimination is economic in a broader sense also. For any community to act
for the good of the larger metropolitan area (by accepting its fair share of low and
moderate income housing) would be to put itself in a less competitive situation (and
thus, to lower property values) in comparison with neighboring communities that do not
choose to accept their fair share. See ADVISORY COMM. TO DEP'T OF HUD, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN
HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 31 (1972).
55. In 1967, 41% of the total non-white population was poor while only 12% of
the white population was poor. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CrrY 45 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING].
56. See authorities cited notes 52 & 53 supra.
57. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (the people of a community have
a right to decide whether they want low and moderate income housing). See also
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1972), a!f'g on rehearing en
banc per curiam 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Federal Courts are reluctant to enter
the field of local government operations.").
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it validated the concept of a zoning ordinance and the deprivation of
property rights which that might entail in the 1920's,58 the Court, with
only two exceptions,5" remained silent on these issues until the
1970's.00 The fact that neither the "Roosevelt Court" nor the "Warren
Court," with their activist approaches to the role of the judiciary and
respect for contemporary social issues, ever became involved in these
issues has left zoning law without any precedent that would justify sig-
nificant judicial intervention. 6'
Second, the Court was apparently unwilling to revive two equal
protection issues on which it might have based a decision favorable to
the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights-that wealth is a suspect classifica-
tion or that housing is a fundamental interest. The Court appears to
be holding to its decision in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez 2 that wealth is a suspect classification only when an
individual is denied a benefit because of his poverty and thereby suf-
fers an "absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that
benefit."' 3  Regardless of whether housing is a benefit that might be
entitled to protection, the fact that plaintiffs were not suffering an abso-
lute deprivation appears to vitiate any claim they might have under
Rodriguez. The right to housing of a particular quality has been speci-
fically denied status as a fundamental interest, 64 although arguably
Arlington Heights does not involve the right to inhabit housing of a par-
ticular quality, but rather the right to inhabit housing in a particular
location.
58. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187(1928).
59. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upheld mining restrictions on a
gravel pit within the city limits that made property virtually useless); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954) (validated exercise of eminent domain powers in urban renewal
program).
60. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (validation of a local
zoning ordinance that placed restrictions on the definition of family as it appeared in the
ordinance); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding provision of state
constitution requiring that state-developed housing for low income persons be approved
only after community approval by referendum).
61. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 53, § 4.03. At one point, however, Justice
Douglas seems to have recognized the problem. Concurring in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), he wrote, "[L]eaving the zoning function to groups which practice
racial discrimination and are licensed by the States constitutes state action in the
narrowest sense in which Shelley v. Kraemer. . .can be construed." Id. at 384-85. See
also Justice Marshall's dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14
(1974).
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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Finally, in remanding the case for consideration of the statutory
claim,"' the Court appears to reiterate its preference for requiring the
legislative branch of government to make those decisions that will have
substantial economic or social impact."0 In Washington the Court
made it clear that where statutory and constitutional claims overlap, it
prefers to require that a plaintiff carry a heavy burden of proof (absent
overt discrimination) with regard to the constitutional claim, leaving it
to the legislature, if it so desires, to prescribe more liberal standards
in a statutory context.67
The Court's deference to the decisions of local officials and its
attempt to place the responsibility for the integration of housing upon
the legislative branch is a short-sighted and dangerous avoidance of its
responsibility. Numerous non-partisan groups have come to the con-
clusion that the present pattern of racial segregation in housing is a very
unhealthy and potentially explosive feature of this society.08 On the
whole, to deny any group of persons access to reasonably priced hous-
ing in the suburbs is to deny that group access to a higher quality edu-
cation, 0 to diminish its ability to compete for new jobs in expanding
industries, 7 and to deny it amenities like fresh air, open space, and
65. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
66. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970);
Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
67. 426 U.S. at 246-48.
68. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK, & A. LEVIN, IN ZONING: A GUIDE TO INCLUSION-
ARY ZONING 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as IN ZONING]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 1, 219 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL DISORDERS]; Testi-
mony of P. Davidoff, in HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY & HOUSING, HEARINGS,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING COMM. REI.]; U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 64-66 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as SUBURBIA]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 167 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BROWN].
That the segregation in housing patterns is increasing is clear. See SUBURBIA, supra,
at 4.
69. Due to the broad disparities in fiscal resources available to school districts, the
wealthier suburbs have better schools than do the central cities. A comparison of
expenditures per pupil and pupil/teacher ratios between central city, and suburban
schools shows that expenditures per pupil in suburbs are about 35% greater and that
pupil/teacher ratios are about 35% lower. Based on these and other facts, a Senate
committee on equal opportunity in education has recommended that HUD take an active
role in the encouragement of low and moderate income housing opportunities outside
areas of present concentration. SELECT COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OP-
PORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45, 51-
52, 148 (1972) [hereinafter cited as EDUC. Opp. REP.]. See also IN ZONING, supra note
68, at 3.
70. See Opening Remarks, in HOUSING COMM. REP., supra note 68, at 6; Testinlo-
ny of P. Davidoff, in id. at 69-70. It should be noted that of the blacks who lived in
ghettos that were racked by the riots of the 1960's, almost half of the respondents to a
survey attributed the riots, at least in part, to discrimination and unfair treatment, and
1977] EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
a lower crime rate.71
The movement of job opportunities to the suburban areas has
been well documented.72  Attracted by the lower property tax rates
and increased space available in suburban locations, businesses and
manufacturers have located their new facilities there to the extent that
from 1952 to 1972 over eighty percent of the newly created jobs in
large metropolitan areas were located in suburban areas.73  A large
portion of these are blue collar jobs that are usually filled by individuals
who would be eligible for low and moderate income housing, but who
have difficulty finding adequately priced housing near those jobs.74  As
a result, some areas are now suffering substantial labor shortages.75 In-
dividuals who are forced to commute from the central cities, if it is
possible to commute, receive much lower wages for their work when
the time and expense of the daily trip to work are factored in.76
The society as a whole also pays a high price for these segregated
housing patterns. By insisting on the integration of schools but not of
nearly a quarter mentioned the unemployment situation. "Better employment" was
chosen almost two-to-one over any other action which the government might take to
prevent future disturbances. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES 48 (1968). For a thorough description of the social and
economic effects that unemployment and underemployment have on inner city residents,
see CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 121-23.
71. The number of arrests per thousand residents is about 50% greater in central
cities than in suburban areas. M. HINDELANG, S. DUNN, A. AUMICK & L. SUTroN,
SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAiSncs-1974, at 336, 341 (1975). In a survey
of black workers in Baltimore, the three community problems most cited were, in order,
robbery, vandalism and violence. D. SOBIN, THE WORKING POOR 98 (1973).
72. See BUILDING, supra note 55, at 47-48; CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 217;
HOUSING COMM. REP., supra note 68, at 69-70; NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIM-
INATION IN HOUSING, THE IMPACT OF HOUSING ON JOB OPPORTUNTrrIES 21 (1968);
SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 24.
73. EDUC. Opp. REP., supra note 69, at 121. Estimates vary as to the precise
magnitude of the trend toward job concentration in the suburbs. Another study cites
figures indicating that over 85% of the new jobs were located in the suburbs during the
last half of the Sixties. SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 24.
74. CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 217; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 25.
75. BABCOCK, supra note 54, at 51, 54. For a discussion of the relation between
land use controls and the proper functioning of the labor market, see Evans & Vestal,
Local Growth Management: A Demographic Perspective, 55 N.C.L. REv. 421 (1977).
76. A study of five major metropolitan areas found that in those cities that had
transit systems capable of transporting inner city residents to suburban job locations,
travel time could range from an hour and a half to five hours a day and might entail
three or four transfers. The cost of transit fares ranged from $4 to $15 per week. These
figures indicate that a worker earning $150 for a 40-hour week, or $3.75/hour, could be
effectively earning only $2.25/hour when transit time and expense are accounted for.
See BUILDING, supra note 55, at 48.
While a white collar suburbanite who commutes into the city may lose a significant
portion of his effective wages to transit costs too, he probably had an opportunity to
choose his home site.
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housing,17 the courts have put a heavy burden on already strained
school budgets78 and have diminished the concept of neighborhood
schools through the forced busing of school children. The cost in terms
of lost natural energy and community spirit is enormous.7 A factor
that ought not be overlooked is the loss of integrity that results from
a society that claims to be a melting pot, that prides itself on social
mobility and yet manages to deny to a significant portion of the popu-
lation the means to effectuate these principles.8
The segregated housing patterns that are in large part responsible
for these deficiencies are not necessarily the result of overt racial dis-
crimination. Racial motivations can easily be hidden using accepted
practices to manipulate the real estate market without any diminution
of the segregative effect.8' Racial motivations can likewise be easily
hidden by zoning officials who offer the protection of property values
as a justification for the exclusion of low and moderate income
families.8s2 For the Court to appraise local zoning decisions in light
of the traditional standards of review is a shallow and ineffective ap-
proach that is certain to avoid confronting the real inequities engen-
dered by many local land use regulations.8 8 The unwillingness of the
77. A study in 1974 concluded that school systems in many of the largest cities and
metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly segregated as a result of segregated housing
patterns. BROWN, supra note 68, at 177-78. See also CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at
236-37, 240-41, 245; Testimony of P. Davidoff, in HoUsING COMM. REP., supra note 68,
at 69.
78. SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 64.
79. For a good discussion of the difficulties encountered in school desegregation
attempts, and an analysis of the community control movement, see M. FANTINI, M.
GITTELL & R. MAGAT, COMMUNITY CONTROL AND THE URBAN SCHOOL 3-22, 77-100
(1970).
80. See BABCOCK, supra note 54, at 50; CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 1-2;
IN ZONING, supra note 68, at 3; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 14.
81. One study provides a particularly good description of how covert discrimination
in the housing market can be equally effective through the steering of prospective buyers
to particular neighborhoods, control of the listings of available housing, refusal of
financial institutions to provide mortgages in certain areas under certain conditions, and
the generally negative attitudes of the real estate brokers and organizations. SuuURBIA,
supra note 68, at 16-23.
That this subtle discrimination is racial and not only economic is suggested by other
studies showing that residential segregation based on race is greater than residential
segregation based on economic class. See EDUC. Opp. REP., supra note 69, at 120. See
also CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 68, at 119.
82. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
83. 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 53, § 5.04. Williams refers to this stage in the
development of land use controls as "Faith in Local Autonomy" and compares it to the
next stage of "Sophisticated Judicial Review," which is
a wiser, more sceptical, and more realistic view of local government and of the
various parties in interest. . . [characterized by]
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legislative branch to slow or reverse this trend 4 is evidenced by the
inefficacy of the Fair Housing Act.8 5  It is at just such a point8 6 that
the Court has previously accepted its responsibility to act to protect the
basic democratic values of the society from the parochial and self-serv-
ing actions of local governments.8 7
A more realistic analysis of . . . the relation between private rights and
public needs ....
A clearer definition of basic democratic values and their implications for
land use controls...
an tAnd] a more active judicial review, examining local action with care
and ready to carry out its constitutional responsibility for enforcing basic
values.
Id. § 5.05, at 107-08.
84. One of the major difficulties with the Court's apparent reliance on congression-
al activity in this field is that those persons presently trapped in inner city areas do not
have the political power to force congressional action. The departure of substantial
numbers of the middle classes to the suburbs has left the cities weakened politically.
BUILDING, supra note 55, at 7; H. ROSE, THE BLAcK GHETTO 107-09, 139-40 (1971).
85. Among the complaints are that HUD is grossly understaffed to deal with the
number of complaints it receives, and that HUD has not pursued the provisions of the
Act with any particular zeal. See BROWN, supra note 68, at 167-68, 174; SUBURBIA,
supra note 68, at 40-42; NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING &
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE 11
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FAIR HOUSING].
86. The need for the Court, in particular, to act now is acknowledged by a number
of authorities:
[T]he relative weakness and lack of success of nonlitigative approaches to the
problem of exclusionary land use have made the resort to litigation necessary
... . [T]he fact that litigation has assumed central importance in the attack
on exclusionary barriers is . . . a reflection of the relative failure thus far
to develop other techniques ....
FAIR HOUSING, supra note 85, at 11.
After noting that the Federal government had started late and had done a lot of
talking about dispersal, but had catered to the exclusionary desires of suburban whites and
failed to provide effective action either legislatively or administratively, the United States
Civil Rights Commission decided that "only in Federal and State adjudication of
exclusionary land use issues are there signs of an understanding of the steps which must
be taken if there is to be a real commitment to dispersal." BROWN, supra note 68, at
167-68.
87. This would not be the first instance in which the Court had enforced a right
not traceable to any specific constitutional provision. In 1941 the Court was faced with
a California statute that made it a crime to assist indigents entering the state. Holding
the statute invalid, the Court stated that no state could wall itself off from national
problems by erecting barriers to interstate migration. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 162-63 (1941). The right to interstate migration is not specified in the Constitu-
tion, but the Court recognized that such a right exists under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 163.
In 1953 the Court found that education of school children was so important to the
individuals and the society that children could not be denied the benefits of racially
desegregated school systems. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953). The
right to an education in a desegregated school system, however, is nowhere specified in
the Constitution, and the equal protection clause would seem, on its face, to justify
separate but equal schools.
In 1968 the Court was confronted with a state statute that prohibited the use of
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The Supreme Court could have begun to remedy some of these
deficiencies without a major break with precedent. The regional per-
spective taken by the court of appeals could have been implemented
either by imposing an affirmative duty upon communities to provide
in their zoning ordinances for housing for families at all income levels,
or by prohibiting a town from frustrating the actions of those who would
attempt to provide housing for low and moderate income groups when
alternative housing was not available in the area.
There is substantial precedent in at least three states for the first
alternative. 88 Courts in Pennsylvania, 0 New Jersey 0 and New York" t
contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Speaking for the Court,
Justice Douglas looked to the "penumbra" of five of the Bill of Rights amendments to
find a right of privacy to protect the sanctity of the marital relationship. Id. at 481-86.
See also Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw & CONTEMv. PROD.
317, 318-19 (1955).
Although the Court has not recognized the quality of housing as a fundamental
interest, it has often recognized the importance of equal opportunities in housing. See
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
88. In addition to the precedents, however, there are numerous reasons why the
first alternative is the more attractive of the two. An affirmative duty has the advantage
of requiring that a community plan for the inclusion of low and moderate income
housing. Low income plaintiffs, then, would not be required to go to the expense of
purchasing a parcel of land and drawing up project plans in order to provide the requisite
standing to bring suit, as was required in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
discussed in note 13 supra. The community and the court are not then restricted to the
specific parcel of land selected by the plaintiffs (and probably chosen for its price and
not because it was the logical location for multifamily housing) in fashioning a remedy.
See generally Moskowitz, Standing of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning Cases, 6
AKRON L. REV. 189 (1973).
The affirmative duty remedy can easily be linked to a region-wide determination of
housing needs and the regional needs-affirmative duty approach appears better to match
the solution with the problem. Numerous studies have discussed the exclusionary effects
of allowing each small incorporated community to use the police power to zone its land.
See, e.g., BUILDING, supra note 55, at 18-20; SUBURBIA, supra note 68, at 29-33. See also
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384-85 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). The self-
protective act of a single community, by itself, does not really have a substantial effect
on the metropolitan housing market. But when seen in concert with similar acts by like
communities, each acting in its own best interest, the pattern and effects become
obvious. See E. BERMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 6 (1974).
The affirmative duty approach has the further advantage of eliminating the competi-
tive disadvantages to which specific communities might be put under the second
alternative. Where each community is required to accept a proportion of low and
moderate income housing needs of the region, each suffers the same "loss," if there
is one, and none is unfairly disadvantaged.
89. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 474-76, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69
(1970) (no township has the power to decide who may or may not live there while
disregarding the interests of the entire area); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970) (township may not exclude uses that are in demand); National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d 597, 610
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have accepted in varying form and degree the concept of a regional
perspective in the matter of zoning for low and moderate income hous-
ing. New Jersey, for example, requires that a developing municipality
make realistic, through its zoning regulations, the accommodation of its
fair share of the region's low and moderate income housing needs.9"
In the federal courts there is some precedent for the latter alterna-
tive."3 A number of lower courts 4 have based their holdings in exclu-
sionary zoning cases on the availability of land for low and moderate
income housing in the region. While those courts almost unanimously
have held for the defendant municipalities,95 their use of the regional
perspective indicates that it is not unreasonable to consider the acts of
a single municipality as they may affect a larger metropolitan area.
Further, in Hills v. Gautreaux,90 a case involving discrimination in pub-
lic housing, 7 the Supreme Court held permissible an inter-jurisdictional
remedy without having found an inter-jurisdictional violation, when that
type of relief was the only reasonable alternative. 98
(1965) (local governments may not use zoning to deny to the growing population of an
area sites for residential development).
90. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (developing
municipality must provide for its fair share of regional needs for low and moderate
income housing).
91. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (town growth management plan
must provide for assimilation of regional population expansion).
92. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
174, 336 A.2d 713, 724, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
93. United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a!I'd, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir.
1970).
94. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974); Acevedo v. Nassau Co., 369 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (E.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborn-
ton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st Cir. 1972).
95. The sole exception was the Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington Heights.
96. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
97. Plaintiffs, black tenants and applicants for public housing in Chicago, brought
class actions against the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD. The action against the
authority alleged that it had deliberately selected public housing sites in Chicago to avoid
integrating white neighborhoods in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the
fourteenth amendment. The action against HUD was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970) and the fifth amendment. Id. at 286.
98. The particular facts of the case, however, may have had a lot to do with the
remedy. Chicago was found to have actively discriminated on the basis of race in its site
selection process, and the remedy would not require the redrawing of any jurisdictional
boundaries because HUD could enforce the remedy. Note, however, that the Court
held, at least in dictum, that the district court had the power to fashion a remedy for
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The case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. presented the court with an opportunity to elabo-
rate on its recent equal protection standards and to deal with the segre-
gative effects of exclusionary zoning. The Court used Arlington
Heights as a vehicle to demonstrate its aversion to equal protection
claims based on a racially discriminatory impact. It also foreclosed, for
the present, the use of the fourteenth amendment as a means to assure
integrated housing and its attendant societal benefits.
EDWIN P. CHESTER
violation from among "'all reasonable methods ... available to formulate an effective
remedy.'" Id. at 297 (quoting North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,
46 (1971)) (emphasis added).
